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BLOCKADE: EVOLUTION AND EXPECTATION
James F. McNulty
INTRODUCTION
The principles of modern international law recognize the doctrine of
blockade as a legitimate option between
states in a declared state of war, giving
them the right to apply naval power to
stop all seaborne commerce with the
enemy, including that carried in neutral
ships. However, the "legality" of this
instrument for exercising national
power is a very tenuous matter in the
minds of jurists, being circumscribed by
a number of significant preconditions,
the absence or violation of any of which
may void the blockader's claim to legitimate right, and expose him to heated
controversy.
The fundamental concept of maritime blockade is an ancient one, and, in
its essence, it seems to be fully in
harmony with the realities of national
existence even in a modern world. However, it is the purpose of this paper to
suggest that the precise technical conditions surrounding the modern instrument of blockade have overlaid this
fundamental concept with elements
which have divorced the doctrine from
reality.
The modern doctrine of blockade
and the associated principles of contraband have evolved over centuries, remaining basically constant in the principles invoked but continuously changing
as to structural details. Thus, there

appears to be a sound basis for considering that the current "legal" definition of
the terms and concept of blockade is
but the most recent step of an evolutionary process which has not yet arrived at logical maturity.
That the process might shortly be
required to respond once more to the
stress of international conflict seems
apparent. With few exceptions, those
modern states having pretensions of
becoming international makeweights
have sought to establish for themselves a
claim to a share in the wealth and
prestige resultant from international
carrying trade. Even the Soviet Union,
long a formidable land power, has begun
to make its presence felt in the great
competitive arena formed by the world's
oceans. Compounding the commercial
threat of this seaward expansion by the
Soviets, the United States is faced as well
with their sponsorship of militant world
communism through the new medium
of "wars of liberation." It seems superfluous to state that the United States
today finds itself in a position analogous
to that of insular Britain in the face of
Napoleon-a power dependent on sea
communication with its allies, its
sources of crucial materials, and its
markets, opposed by a dedicated and
ingenious enemy having central lines of
communication. To confine that threat
to the limits of continental Europe was
the aim of Britain's effort in the 18th
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and 19th centuries, while the aim of the
United States today must also be to
contain the Communist threat within
the limits of its existing sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe and Asia.
Britain's success against Napoleon
was gained largely through her intelligent application of all the devices of
seapower available to her, including that
of blockade-not a blockade according
to rules made by scholars and law
clerks, but one governed by rules born
of the dictates of necessity and the
talents of seamen-a viable doctrine,
responsive less to the protests of diplomats than to the realities of the threat
to be overcome.
This paper proposes to review in
detail the evolutionary process to which
the concept of maritime blockade has
been subjected in order to point out the
historic facility by which nations yield
up principle in favor of political reality.
Further, it is intended to illustrate that
the doctrine of blockade is merely part
of a larger scheme which is appropriate
for application as an instrument of
national power in the complex international society of the current century.
It will not be advocated that the
"rule of law" so treasured by our
Western society be overthrown in a
qucst for temporary advantage. It is
hoped merely to articulate what is
believed to be an existing ground swell
of legal and lay opinion that "laws and
institutions are constantly tending to
gravitate. Like clocks, they must be
occasionally cleansed, and wound up,
and set to the true time. ,,1
I-FOUNDATION OF THE LAW
AND CUSTOM OF BLOCKADE
In ancient times, conflicts between
rulers of tribes or the early city-states
usually resulted in the involvement of
all political entities adjacent to associated military operations. Belligerents, as
the active participants became known,
always attempted to convert non-

participators into allies; failing in that, it
was expected that action could be taken
to at least insure that the opposition
would not receive the assistance of
bystanders. Such action normally resulted in some form of operations
against the commerce of the neutrals, as
they later came to be known, and such
interference was justified on political
rather than legal grounds, if indeed it
were thought necessary to justify it at
all? In those early centuries of human
violence, the "style" of warfare was
usually that of the siege against the
strong points of an enemy rather than
general campaigns throughout the countryside. Under such circumstances, little
need existed among states to formulate
any sort of legal basis for regulating the
trade of neutrals with all belligerents,
since it was clearly unprofitable for an
apolitical neutral to attempt to continue
trade with a besieged point when a
ready market for his goods existed
among the besiegers. On the other hand,
neutrals were normally required to continue trade with any accessible belligerent, since "the discontinuance by a
neutral of intercourse with either belligerent, where not an effect of the
operations taking place ... seemed
... so plain a form of alliance with or
subservience to, the other ... "3 that it
was clearly a political act rather than
one arguable as a matter oflaw.
Before it was possible to contemplate
legal justification for the continuance or
suspension of commerce with a belligerent by a neutral, it was first necessary
for the concept of neutrality to become
in "some" form a recognized institution
of the law of nations, and until the
freedom of neutral commerce was in
some form guaranteed. '>4 This status of
authorized impartiality of third states
while war raged between others was not
formalized and incorporated into the
law of nations as the institution of
neutrality until the 16th century. 5 Until
that time, the principle of land warfare
which forbade all forms of intercourse
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with hesieged places governed. Toward
the later portion of the period the
growth of international commerce intensified the helief that partial neutrality was unjust, and rules aimed at
formalizing the limits of a "just neutrality" hegan to evolve. The earliest of
these rules ended the total interdiction
of neutral commerce with hesieged
places hut enjoined neutrals from transporting into such places either armed
troops or specified materials which
would tend to mitigate the effects of
the siege. 6 One author points out that
this relaxation was more significant as
the estahlishment of a principle rather
than any meaningful authorization to
trade, "since places so circumscrihed
would he very unlikely markets to seek
with articles not of some immediate
utility to the defense. "7
Thus, hy the 16th century, at least
some elementary rules regulating neutral
commerce with respect to helligerents
existed, although they were derived
principally from the experiences of land
warfare. It was at this time that the
unilateral action of one state, Holland,
introduced into the growing stream of
international law a new principle, hased
in part on older precedent. The principle was that of hlockade, wherehy a
helligerent has come to he entitled as a
matter of law to cut off the free access
of neutral commerce to the ports or
coast of an enemy.8
In 1584, while at war with the
Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch Government issued a proclamation (placaat)
declaring that all Flanders ports then in
the hands of Spain were under siege
from the sea, and that no commerce
would he allowed entry. 9 This pretension was hased on the ancient right of a
hesieger to prevent hy all means availahle the crossing of a line of investment
hy a neutral and the fact that the Dutch
naval forces had considerahle power to
enforce the declaration on neutrals
seeking entry. Significantly, no effort
was made to invest these ports with land

forces at the same time, although it was
clearly the Dutch intention "to usc the
right of siege on an unprecedented
scale."IO
The concept of the maritime hlockade thus was estahlished at the end of
the 16th century, hut hefore any sense
of legality could he attached to it, it was
necessary for the puhlicists to hegin the
process of formalizing the institution hy
incorporating it into the growing hody
of writings which we have come to
know as the law of nations. The most
renowned of the early puhlicists,
Grotius, writing in 1624, ohliquely mentions the justification for the closure of
ports as distinct from the idea of concurrent siege hy land forces in the
following terms:
For if I cannot defend myself
without intercepting what is sent,
necessity ... will give me the right
to intercept it .... If the introduction of the supplies impeded me
in the pursuit of my right, and
this was open to the knowledge of
the person who introduced them,
as if I was [sic] keeping a town
invested, or ports closed, and a
surrender or peace was already
looked for, he will he hound to
repay me for the damage occasioned hy his fault .... 11 (Emphasis added.)
This early articulation hy Grotius is
significant for several reasons. First, hy
the use of the words "keeping a town
invested, or ports closed," he seems to
imply that he was considering two
distinct concepts, one of siege in the
traditional sense, and the other of
hlockade in the more modern sense,
although he fails to use the word
"hlockade. "12 Secondly, the use of the
phrase, "and a surrender or peace was
already looked for," has heen interpreted as indicating an essential difference hetween actual hloekades hacked
up hy real naval strength as opposed to
fictitious hlockades laid on only hy
placaat. I3 It is exactly this point of
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actual vcrsus "paper" blockades that
latcr became so controversial in the
cvolution of ncutral rights at sea, and it
is notcworthy to sce that this issue was
anticipated in the earliest days of the
institution. Finally, the statement actually prohibits all commerce with besicgcd places, since, as noted above,
such places would have little interest in
goods not helpful in some way to the
dcfcnse, and all such goods were historically prohibited.
In 1630, with Grotius' formulation
only five years old, the Dutch once
more desired to apply naval pressure- on
Flanders, but by this date had not the
means to apply this new form of siege
to all ports at the same time. Questioning the applicability of blockade under
these conditions, and fearing to antagonize the now-neutral England, the
Admiralty of Amsterdam was queried
for its opinion. The analysis given was
summed up by a jurist writing in a later
century, and was to the effect that "the
rule which obtains in the case of towns,
which are properly said to be besieged ... extends also to the enemy's
ports, which when invested by ships, are
said to be besieged. ,,14 Accordingly, the
States General announced in a placaat
dated 9 July 1630, that the Flanders
coast was blockaded and that neutral
ships found at any distance from
Flandcrs intending to call at those ports
would be confiscated. Further, the
placaat went on to state that ships
which succeeded in passing the blockade
into Flanders ports would remain subject to confiscation wherever intercepted on the outward voyage. 15 Here,
then, is the source document of the
modern institution of blockade-all
commerce to be cut off, without regard
to its status as contraband, with the
further claim to vast powers over neutral commerce far removed from the
actual place of investment. This pretentious claim by the Dutch did not remain
unchallenged, of course. Although the
blockade thus established did not last

very long and no records are available as
to its results, the swift development of a
body of treaties between Holland and
various countries beginning with the
French in 1646 (all of which rejected
the broad principles of the 1630
placaat) indicates vigorous neutral diplomatic activity to secure their trade with
belligerents. 16 Such activity continues
even today.
As the proponents of the institution
of blockade, the Dutch continued to
figure prominently in its development
so long as they remained a significant
seapower. Their stewardship of the institution during this era has been characterized by the English jurist Westlake as
having been "marked by the widest
renunciation of the right to interfere
with neutral commerce, the widest
actual intederence with it when opportunity offered, and the absolute refusal
to recognize [the right to] a similar
interference with it by others."1 7 The
Dutch did not remain alone for long, as
the changing realities of European
power soon brought the rising seapower
of England into partnership with them
in proclaiming a blockade "of France
and all French possessions" after 1689.
In this proclamation, both states resurrected completely the spirit of the 1630
Dutch placaat by asserting the intention
of capturing ships bound for French
ports wherever found. 18 This first
appearance of England as a blockading
power should be marked as some sort of
milestone since she continued to occupy
that role almost perpetually afterward,
rapidly assuming from Dutch hands the
responsibility for enforcing and enlarging the doctrine. Additionally, Westlake claims that this event is the
probable source of the basis for all
English (and consequently American)
Prize Law, which, according to repeated
Admiralty and U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, has been derived from "the
received law of nations": i.e., the
placaat of 1630. 19
The British, however, did not
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vacillate in their application of this new
doctrine as had the Dutch. They
claimed the right to interdict completely neutral commerce bound for
their opponents and in the years immediately following established the
British "doctrine of war that, no matter
by whom carried, goods for an enemy or
belonging to an enemy could legitimately be taken. '>2 0 From this date
onward, the history of blockade is
largely the history of England and her
rise to maritime greatness. When Britannia ruled the waves, one of the most
efficient tools of her leadership was the
blockade.

II-BRITISH SEAPOWER
AND BLOCKADE
Throughout the 18th century,
Europe was in an almost constant state
of war, with Britain sometimes a belligerent, sometimes neutral, and sometimes cast in both roles simultaneously.21 During the period, the crucible
of frequent and intensifying war not
only permitted the forging of a refined
instrument of blockade but forced as
well the advancement of naval technology at an accelerated pace. In 1700,
fleets generally duplicated the practice
of land armies in retiring to winter
quarters, leaving only a small force to
patrol vital areas. By 1800, large squadrons were able to be constantly at sea,
exercising dominion over vast areas of
the ocean surfaces by virtne of their
presence. Such increased activity "made
far more rigorous and oppressive" those
British assertions over control of neutral
commerce made in earlier years. 22 The
growing presence of the Royal Navy at
sea was met by ever more vociferous,
but generally ineffective, resistance on
the part of maritime neutrals toward
interference with their claimed rights to
trade with any country with which they
were at peace.
The turbulence of the age was
capped by the cataclysmic struggle

against the French Revolution and
Napoleon. A passage by Mahan best
describes the situation as it affected
neutral states:
In the effort to bring under the
yoke of their own policy the
commerce of the whole world, the
two chief contestants, France and
Great Britain, swayed back and
forth in deadly grapple over the
vast arena, trampling underfoot
the rights and interests of the
weaker parties; who, whether as
neutrals, or as subjects of friendly
or allied powers, looked helplessly
on, and found that in this great
struggle for self-preservation,
neither outcries, nor threats, nor
despairing submission, availed to
lessen the pressure that was gradually crushing out both hope and
life. 23
British practice was especially
onerous, as she clung to her contention
that blockades were enforceable by
far-ranging isolated cruisers, and she
frequently declared blockades backed
by just sufficient naval force as to
permit the barest claim to efficiency.
But the real basis of neutral complaint
against England was the belief that the
British use of the blockade often had
the aim, not to deprive an enemy of
goods, but to secure for Englishmen the
trade thus barred to neutrals. The .
suspicion appears justified in the light of
an observation by Lord Grenville in a
letter of 18 February 1806, in which he
says:
We have a right to prevent that
[trade] which is injurious to us,
and may, if we think right, in
cases where we think the advantage to ourselves compensates or
overbalances the injury; a principle manifest in the case of a siege,
where we exclude all the world
from intercourse with the town
besieged, but carry it on ourselves,
whenever we think it beneficial to
our interests to do SO.24
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In response to this so-called British
system, "the continental powers began
to aim only at establishing some rule
which should prevent ineffe'ctive, and
therefore ... inequitable, blockades. "25
These continental powers advocated
another interpretation of the blockade
principle which was drawn from their
own experience as maritime states more
often cast in the role of neutrals rather
than belligerents. In their view, blockades could only be legitimate "if there
be manifest danger in entering the
blockaded port, from the cannon either
of ships, stationary and sufficiently ncar
one another, or of works on land.'>2 6
That is, they claimed that the right of
the blockading power to interdict noncontraband neutral commerce derived
solely from the blockader's ability to
control the sea immediately off the port
in the same sense that a besieging army
could command the land approaches to
a town. 27
,
Countering this claim, the British
insisted that the legality of a blockade
was proven if the blockader could
"maintain such a force as would be of
itself sufficient to enforce the blockade. ,>2 8 Additionally, Britain refused to
accept any limitation on the geographic
placement of the blockading forces or
of their numbers. The real danger
needed to make a blockade effective,
and thus legal, she asserted, could be
posed by numbers of individual cruising
warships even at great distances from
the blockaded coast; and that such
cruisers, in keeping with the practice of
Holland in earlier years, could capture
lawfully even intended violators of the
blockade. The British position, thus,
was identical to that of the Dutch at the
time of the 1630 placaat, and, as the
Mahan quote above indicates, no power
or plea could move them from it in the
face of the threat from France.
At the same time, however, it was
realized in Britain that the maritime
balance of the world had begun to shift
from European waters, for "a new

power had now arisen on the western
shore of the Atlantic, whose position,
and maritime spirit, were calculated to
give new and vast importance to every
question of neutral rights. '>2 9 The early
British appreciation of deep American
interest in affairs concerning maritime
neutral rights was predicated on the
announced aims of the newborn Republic from the earliest days of independence. 3o Even the earliest American
diplomacy attempted to deal with all
aspects of maritime commercial
freedom in order to secure for her
private traders and national good the
benefits of international commerce, but
the basic American view of blockade is
best represented in the instructions
given to the American Minister in
London in 1804, which said, in part:
In order to determine what
characterizes a blockaded port,
that denomination is given only
... where there is by the disposition of ... ships stationary or sufficiently ncar an evident danger in
entering. 31
The fictitious blockades proclaimed by Great Britain, and
made the pretext for violating the
commerce of neutral nations, has
been one of the greatest abuses
ever committed on the high
seas. ... The whole scene was a
perfect mockery, in which fact
was sacrificed to form, and right
to power and plunder. 32
What had been a controversy between Britain and the continental neutrals was now joined by a parallel, but
independent, controversy between
Britain and America; yet, British determination to uphold her position "became a cornerstone of national policy,"
and "was considered of such importance
in 1812 that ... we considered the disadvantages of having the United States
added to our enemies less than those
that would follow from a modification
of our code. "3 3 This intransigence had
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its expected result when President Madison "made clear that 'mock blockades'
were one of the principal causes of the
war" which opened in 1812.34
Neither the European settlement at
Vienna in 1815 nor the Treaty of Ghent
between Britain and the United States
late in the preceding year resolved the
issues of neutral rights so hotly contested through the previous 25 years. It
remained for the next major European
war to bring about the conditions under
which some degree of reconciliation
between the opposing views could be
attained. In 1854, the perpetual enemies, continental France and insular
Britain, were allies in the Crimean War
which opened in that year. If they were
to be effective in the joint application
of their seapower, it was recognized that
some compromise must be struck on
their policies toward neutral rights at
sea, and a temporary agreement was
reached. At the Congress of Paris in
1856, this compromise was enacted into
a joint convention among the states
present and was promulgated as the
Declaration of Paris, in which all maritime powers were invited to join. 35
The Declaration of Paris represented
the first codification of the rules of
maritime war which was generally
accepted among maritime states. The
Declaration consisted of four points of
agreement among the powers, of which
the first abolished privateering, and the
fourth declared the principle that:
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to
say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to
the coast of the enemy. 3 6
Even this enunciation fell far short of
complete reconciliation of the differences of the powers, as the language
apparently was left deliberately obscure
and ambiguous. Britain remained free to
interpret "force sufficient really to prevent access" as she might see her interests at the moment. In retrospect, it is
clear that the Declaration simply

codified the pragmatic essence of recent
experience, and is significant less for its
content than for the fact that any
agreement was possible among the selfseeking states which authored it. It is
significant to point out that it was
historic British policy and seapower
after 1689 which essentially fixed both
the form and scope of the Declaration,
since the principles set forward either
conformed directly with those policies
or were generated by the erosion of
certain facets of them by decades of
neutral resistance.
The broad theoretical claims of British blockade policy over those years
were given meaning and effect by British seamen. However, the reality of
British principle is summed up by the
remarks of one Member of Parliament,
who, after acknowledging insular Britain's dependence on imported food and
exported manufactures, goes on to say:
These considerations have
always led us, practically,' to violate our own theory of a commercial blockade, whenever the
power to do so has remained in
our hands .... It is true we have
maintained, for our navy, the traditional right and duty of a blockade, whilst (I beg your attention
to the distinction) we have invariably connived at its evasion. 3 7
III-AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON
THE LAW: CONTINUOUS VOYAGE
Although American influence on the
Declaration of Paris was negligible, the
maturing of her sea strength and the
necessities of the American Civil War
which broke out in 1861 were to leave a
distinct American influence on the
further evolution of the recognized principles of blockade. During that conflict,
American courts were to apply a principle to blockade which had once been
purely a colonial policy of the European
mercantilist states, i.e., the Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage. 3 8
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Shortly before the outbreak of the
insurrection, the United States position
with respect to the law of blockade was
summarized in the instructions of the
American Secretary ,of State to American Ministers abroad. The position
taken reverted to the archaic view of the
blockade as an extension to seaward of
investing forces around localized military strongpoints. In the words of the
Secretary:
The investment of a place by
sea and land with a view to its
reduction ... is a legitimate mode
of prosecuting hostilities .... But
the blockade of a coast, or of
commercial positions along it,
without any regard to ulterior
military operations, and with the
real design of carrying on a war
against trade ... is a proceeding
which is difficult to reconcile with
reason or with the opinions of
modern times. To watch every
creek, and river, and harbour
upon an ocean frontier, in order
to seize and confiscate every vessel ... attempting to enter or go
out, without any direct effect
upon the true objects of war, is a
mode of conducting hostilities
which would find few advocates if
now first presented for consideration. 39
This interpretation was one not only
substantially out of step with the distilled theory of the previous centuries
but one directly contrary to that
adoptcd by the Federal forces in 186l.
It is instructive only as one additional
example of the readiness of states in the
international community to lay whatever interpretation on ambiguous aspects of the law of nations as best serves
their instant interests. In 1859, Cass was
expressing an interpretation that would
favor the commercial interests of the
United States in any contest of major
European naval powers; it represents
merely a diplomatic gambit to compensatc for America's weak naval strength

as opposed' to the European states. In
1861, however, the Federal Government
found itself at war with a group of
southern states whose maritime potential was miniscule compared to that of
the North, and consequently we find
the North quickly attempting to occupy
the same "high ground" so firmly held
by Great Britain vis-a-vis the United
States. Once more, principle yielded to
political reality.
President Lincoln acted within a
week of the fall of Fort Sumter to
proclaim on 19 April 1861, that the
ports of the rebellious states from South
Carolina to Texas were blockaded "in
pursuance of the laws of the United
States and the law of nations," later
extending the blockade to the states of
Virginia and North Carolina as their
rebel status became apparent. 40
Although the United States had refused to accede to the recent Declaration of Paris,4 i the question of effectiveness of the blockade was immediately a point of controversy, as the
United States had long championed the
principle of "effectiveness" as a determinant of legality. One historian has
noted that in April 1861 the Federal
Navy possessed only 35 modern vessels,
and that only three steam-propelled
vessels were immediately available for
blockade duty.42 Another points out
that the length of the shoreline to be
interdicted by this force was in excess
of 3,500 miles, from Washington down
the Potomac around to the mouth of
the Rio Grande, and that it included
189 river mouths and harbors. 43
It is easy to visualize the mixture of
skepticism and outrage with which Britain and the other European maritime
powers greeted the pretensions of the
Federal Government! Truly, "an effective blockade on such a scale was a thing
unprecedented, even in the operations
of the foremost naval powers in the
world. ,>44
Nevertheless, the normal seaborne
trade of the southern states declined
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immediately after the proclamation of
blockade, partly because some neutrals
acceded to it voluntarily and took their
trade elsewhere, but more likely because
of the normal dislocation of trade accompanying a shift from a peacetime to
a wartime economy.45 This reduction
of trade and its effect on the price of
cotton in Europe lent credence to the
Federal claim to effectiveness of their
skeletal sea forces in the early months
of the blockade.46
Soon, however, the weakness of the
Federal force, combined with the growing demand in the South for the import
of the sinews of war, encouraged the
development of enlarged trade efforts in
defiance of the blockade. Since under
Anglo-American policies the liability to
capture began for the blockade runner
at the moment of departure on the
illegal voyage, enterprising shippers
sought to shorten this exposure to a
minimum. The several neutral ports
which closely surrounded the blockaded
area, such as Bermuda, Nassau, Havana,
etc., soon became entrepots for the
transshipment of goods bound in and
out of the South. The arrangement
facilitated specialization of shipping
used in the trade, with fast, shallowdraft steamers used for the two- or
three-day run in and out of the blockaded ports, and large slow, and stout
vessels used for the long ocean crossing
to Europe. 4 7
The Federal authorities now looked
to the mercantilist Doctrine of Continuous Voyage as justification for the
arresting of this trade. Union cruisers
operated far offshore to back up the
forces available for close-in observation
of southern ports, and deliberately
positioned themselves to intercept
oceangoing traffic bound from Europe
to the various neutral ports off the
southern coast. They soon began to
bring in for adjudication under prize law
a number of neutral vessels, mostly
British, which appeared from their
cargoes and documents to be enroute to

such ports. In the first announced decision, which was not appealed by the
British owners, ship and cargo were
condemned for attempting violation of
the blockade. The U.S. District Court
held that:
The cutting up of a continuous
voyage into several parts ... cannot make a voyage which in its
nature is one to become two or
more voyages, nor make any of
one entire voyage to become legal
which would be illegal if not so
divided. 48
A better-known case, that of the Bermuda, which was finally decided in
1865, is even more definitive of the
Doctrine as applied by the American
Courts. Intercepted on a voyage between Bermuda and Nassau, both neutral ports, the Bermuda and her cargo
were condemned by the District Court
for attempted blockade running. On
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
decision was confirmed, because, in the
words of the Court:
Successive voyages, connected
by a common plan and a common
object, form a plural unit. They
are links in the same chain, each
identical in description with every
other, and each essential to the
continuous whole. The ships are
planks of the same bridge, all of
the same kind, and all necessary
to the convenient passage of persons and property from one end
to the other. 4 'l1
The most celebrated case of the war was
that of the Springbok, which had been
captured enroute from London to Matamoros, Mexico, a port adjacent to the
Rebel port of Brownsville, Texas. On
appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed
the condemnation of the cargo only,
saying:
That the voyage ... was as to
cargo, both in law and in the
intent of the parties, one voyage;
and that the liability to condemnation ... attached to the

181
cargo from the time of
sailing.50
Two significant aspects of the Springbok case are worth noting. First, the
initial condemnation had been based on
evidence adduced from two other cases
then in the process of being tried. 51
This violated the traditional principle
that condemnation must derive solely
on evidence adduced from the ship's
papers or the responses of her officers
or crew to interrogation. Secondly, the
British Government openly approved
the decision in its rejection of the
request of the British owners for an
expression of protest, by saying:
Having regard to the very
doubtful character of all trade
ostensibly carried on at Nassau,
and to many other circumstances
of suspicion before the Court, Her
Majesty's Government are not disposed to consider the argument of
the court on this point as otherwise than tenable. 5 2
Some observers53 viewed the absence of
British protest as reflecting a sinister
intent to let the method and decision
stand as a precedent upon which to base
future British actions, as in fact they did
during World War 1.
In the extension of the Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage to blockade, the
Amcrican courts had moved into an
area without exact precedent; even in
the colonial confiscations, no ship or
cargo had been condemned during the
first stage of an illegal voyage. Understandably, international jurists
expressed general disapproval, and over
the next several decades dozens of
criticisms of the American action were
delivered within the international law
community. This wave of disapproval
culminated in an expression by the
maritime prize committee of the Institute of International Law in 1882
that such a doctrine, if allowed to
stand, would "annihilate" neutral trade
on the mere "suspicion that the cargo . .. may be transshipped ... and

carried to some effectively hlockaded
port. "54
The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage
was not a uniquely American contribution to the developing law, being
founded in earlier British colonial practice, but its application to blockade hy
American courts opened the Pandora's
box which had long served to contain in
large measure the most volatile issues of
neutral rights. By this action, the United
States unwittingly contributed to the
growing demand of all maritime powers
for some consensual formulation of the
law of maritime warfare, a demand
which was realized shortly after the
opening of the new century at the
London Conference of 1908-1909. At
that conference, the confused interpretations of centuries of experience would
be clarified in a code of maritime
warfare known as the Declaration of
London-a code which even now in the
1960's stands as the only· accepted
formulation of the law of blockade and
contraband.
IV-PRECEDENT ENSHRINED:
THE DECLARATION
OF LONDON, 1909
The Hague Peace Conference of 1907,
at the suggestion of both the British and
German delegates, adopted a Convention
for the establishment of an International
Prize Court as a court of appeal from the
national prize courts which alone had
traditionally evaluated the lawfulness of
captures made at sea in time of war.
Before such a court could function,
however, it was necessary for all maritime
powers to agree on the standards of
maritime warfare which the Court would
be required to enforce. Accordingly,
Great Britain suggested that a conference
of such states be assembled in London in
late 1908 to formulate "rules which, in
the absence of special treaty provisions
applicable to a particular case, the Court
should observe in dealing with appeals
brought before it. "5 5
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Such a conference did convene in
November 1908, and proceeded to
devise a code of maritime warfare which
was generally acceptable to the representatives of the maritime community.
It was issued in February 1909 as the
Declaration of London.
The Declaration was the first, and
only, exhaustive compilation of all the
aspects of maritime warfare which had
for so long divided the maritime powers
of the world. Even though the Declaration ultimately failed to be incorporated
formally into the law of nations, it
remains even today as the basis for the
current international law on blockade,
contraband, and neutral maritime rights.
The Declaration treated the matters
of blockade and contraband quite extensively, devoting 44 of its 71- Articles
to those topics. In brief, it confirmed
the 1856 pronouncement of effectiveness as the test for legality of blockade
and, contrary to the wishes of the
United States,S 6 forbade the application of the Doctrine of Continuous
Voyage to blockades, reserving it for use
only against absolute contraband. 57
Further, the Declaration forbade interference by blockading forces with access
to neutral coasts or ports, a point much
sought after by the northern European
neutrals. 58
When the Conference adjourned on
26 February 1909, the delegates returned home feeling that they had
contributed to a great stride forward in
the regularization of international
affairs. However, despite Britain's role
as sponsor, the publication of the Declaration while pending ratification
brought great opposition by many
Britons who saw it as an abdication of
British power. 5 9 When the House of
Lords failed to enact a bill in support of
the International Prize Court in 1911,
the Declaration was effectively rejected.
Since Britain had failed to take the
initiative in ratifying the Declaration,
the remaining powers saw the futility of
attempting to consider it as a viable

segment of the law of nations, and the
Declaration began to gather dust on the
shelves of law libraries throughout the
world.
Nevertheless, the Declaration did
exist as the most recent consensus of
the law of maritime war when World
War I broke out in 1914. Further, since
British representatives had contributed
to its construction and had endorsed its
provisions at the close of the Conference, the maritime powers of the
world looked on the defunct Declaration as "not merely a codification of
law," but as a "declaration of British
maritime policy. ,,60
Although this appraisal may have
been accurate under the conditions
existing in 1909, it appears that when
faced with the actuality of war with the
Central Powers in 1914, Britain realized
that a blanket acceptance of the Declaration would be inimical to her national interest. Consequently, she announced on 20 August 1914, that the
Declaration would be the general basis
of her maritime policy during the war
but "with certain modifications. '061
These modifications ultimately rendered
impotent the most significant advances
made under the Declaration, from the
point of view of the neutral maritime
states. By 1918, the terms of the Declaration aimed at protecting neutral
rights had been honored more by their
breach than their observance. With
respect to the detailed principles of the
law of blockade so extensively set out in
the Declaration, Britain avoided their
restrictions simply by not declaring a
formal blockade. The rationale was
quite pragmatic, although not expressed
openly until long after the war. From
the British view,
A formal declaration of blockade was deemed inadvisable for
strategic and legal reasons; naval
experts realized that we could not
operate successfully in the Baltic
with any continuity.... Moreover, the Baltic is only one of the
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commercial gates into Germany,
and much of her trade arrives via
Rotterdam .... Thus, it would be
wiser not to announce the word
"blockade. ,062
The prewar views of at least one
British naval authority had recognized
before 1911 that the realities of modem
war had outstripped the detailed legalisms of the Declaration. After noting
the practical impossibility of maintaining a close blockade against a continental enemy in the face of submarines,
torpedo boats, and mines, this prescient
naval officer went on to assert that the
doctrine of blockade had become
merged within a larger doctrine dictated
by 20th century necessity-that of total
economic war. Pointing out the particular sensitivity of both Britain and Germany to attack through their commerce, he went on to outline proposed
British actions in the event of a war
with Germany on the assumption that
the terms of the London Declaration
could be ignored or avoided. He
advised:
In that case, our obvious
course, to be adopted as soon as
the naval situation permitted,
would be to declare a blockade of
the North Sea ports, and simultaneously to make a sweeping
declaration of what was contraband, including all the principal
raw materials .... Neutral vessels.
would be rigorously held up and
cxamined ... the doctrine of continuous voy~e would be rigorously applied. 3
The British actions after 1914 closely
paralleled this program with all manner
of additional devices employed in the
effort to completely cut off all German
sea commerce. These activities greatly
antagonized the neutral trading powers
but ultimately resulted in the total
disruption of German economic
strength and starvation for her population. Despite an intention early in the
war to remain within the generally

accepted rules of the Declaration, by
1915 the effects of new technology had
begun to be exerted, and both Germany
and Britain embarked on open and
unrestricted economic war against the
other's commerce. It might be suggested
that the only principle of international
law which was strictly observed
throughout the war was that of necessity, whereunder all manner of heretofore reprehensible actions could at least
be rationalized.
The enactment of the Declaration, its
failure of ratification, and its ultimate
rejection under the stress of modem
technology are all significant to this
study, but it seems specious to berate
the obvious direct contribution of these
events to the thesis of this paper. It
seems more profitable to point out
some of the less obvious lessons to be
drawn from this experience.
The code of maritime war hammered
out by the delegates to London in
1908-1909 has made a contribution to
the developing law of nations. It is
instructive primarily as a codification of
historical experience, and also as example of the considerable risk inherent
in the enshrinement of precedent without regard either to the special circumstances of its creation or the immediate
realities of existing· technology and
politics.
V-CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
The evolutionary process described
in earlier chapters has remained essentially at a standstill since the abortive
London Declaration of 1909. Despite
the failure of the Declaration to be
formally adopted by the international
community, and despite the almost universal rejection of its key principles
during the major wars of this century,
the terms of the Declaration are yet
considered to be an acceptable expression of the developed law of maritime
warfare. This paradox is explained by
the customary practice of the inter-
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national legal profession of regarding all
such consensual agreements among
states as contributory to the formation
of law. In its view, the Declaration itself
is meaningless as a matter of law; but it
is significant still because it represents
the then-current views of the international community and, thus, can be
used as a standard against which to
compare state practices since that time.
Thus, it is common to find heavy
reliance placed by jurists and publicists
on the terms of the Declaration in their
extensive writings on the subject of
maritime warfare.
There are, therefore, some number of
fundamental characteristics which a
given instance of blockade must display
if it is to avoid condemnation by the
international jurist and thus command
the respect and cooperation of the
community of nations which inhabit the
modern world. These characteristics are
derived from the terms of the entire
developed body of the law, including
the London Declaration which so conveniently reflects previous experience. It
will be meaningful, then, to review
those characteristics given the greatest
significance by those two bodies of
organized opinion: First, in order to
complete the summary of the evolutionary process begun in the 17th century; and second, to permit a critical
analysis of the continued validity of
such criteria in the world of today.
The first principle generally applied
is that the right to blockade is one
deriving only to a belligerent power,
solely as a function of the existence of
that state of belligerency.64 Modern
publicists do recognize a similar institution under a condition short of belligerency known as pacific blockade, but
generally dismiss this device of the 19th
century as outmoded65 and in any
event not subject to the principles of
commercial blockade under discussion.
Secondly, the acknowledged principle of the Declaration of Paris regarding
effectiveness is regarded as crucial to

establishing the legal sufficiency of a
blockade since this element requires the
application of actual naval power to
enforce the blockade, and is the only
principle truly accepted as a part of the
law of nations on the subject of blockade. 66
Further conditions must be satisfied,
and they are- again usually found to have
been expressed in the London Declaration. Among them is the requirement
that blockades must be confined to the
coasts or ports of the enemy and that
access to neutral ports may not be
restricted. 67 A natural corollary to this
requirement is the principle that captures may not be made if, at the
moment of interception, the neutral
vessel is enroute to a neutral port. 68
This, of course, prevents the application
of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage
to blockades and constitutes a rejection
by the international law community of
American practice during the Civil War.
The issue of when a vessel becomes
liable to condemnation for breach of
blockade was left obscure by the London Declaration, which merely mentions the possibility of condemnation if
"at the time of shipment of the goods"
the shipper could be presumed or
proven to have knowledge of intent to
break the blockade. 69 However, it
appears that at least Anglo-American
jurists would support the practice
whereunder liability would commence
at the instant of departure for a blockaded port. Such a position appears to
have been supported by American practice in 1917.70
In addition to imposing restrictive
conditions on the blockading state, current law as expressed by the publicists
continues to reward it by acknowledging its right to stop completely all sea
traffic enroute to or from the enemy. 71
In the view of the international law
community, no state has the right to
seize or delay commerce on the high
seas except under specific conditions
associated with belligerent and neutral
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status; it is, therefore, asserted by them
that the advantages to be secured by a
state only under the precise conditions
associated with the developed law of
blockade are sufficient to warrant the
insistence that states comply completely
with these conditions when exerting
naval power against commerce at sea.
It appears, however, that there are
some fatal flaws in this argument, some
of which are traceable to faults in the
source of modem law and others arising
purely from the modem status of international law itself.
First, it is clear that the technical
conditions of the modem law of blockade are derived from the experience of
maritime states since the 17th century,
and that these conditions are the
progeny of similar terms expressed in
the Declaration of London. But, if the
Declaration itself could have been regarded within only a few years of its
formulation as "merely a body of rules
for regulating naval operations against
commercial systems that had disappeared, "72 is it not valid to suspect
that a modernized form of that code is
equally contaminated by that charge of
anachronism? In short, does the view
of blockade expressed by modem
writers agree with the realities of the
social and economic system which it
seeks to regulate as sound international
law must do,73 or is it so far out of step
with the reality that it needs to "be set
to true time"?

VI-BLOCKADE IN THE
COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT
It has been shown that the developed
law of blockade has evolved parallel to
and coordinate with that body of rules
generally referred to as international law
or the law of nations. The general
subject, international law, is one of
enormous scope and importance in the
modem world. However, it is also one
of broad controversy, imprecise both in
acceptance and application-a thicket

into which a .layman may proceed only
with great caution after accepting the
sure knowledge that at least as many
authorities in the field will disagree with
him as may be inclined to agree with his
views. However, it is necessary to at
least express some general views about
the institution in order to analyze the
position in its context of the modem
law of blockade.
First, international law must be a
tool of world society to be applied in
regulating the political and economic
affairs among the member states of that
society. Historically, the applications of
this tool have met with varying degrees
of success and cooperation. Generally,
the greatest success has occurred in
applications to matters of obvious
benefit to all states, such as in the
establishment of rules for the prevention of collisions at sea and the principles governing the exchange of diplomatic and consular agents. Further, it
appears that international law has
shown the ability to grow in usefulness
with the passage of time. Those of a
legalistic tum of mind might suggest
that this growing utility arises primarily
from the parallel growth of custom and
precedent, touching on an ever-wider
scope of matters of interest to state
relations. It seems more believable,
though, to attribute the growing influence of the law to the increased recognition by states of the necessity for
members of international society to get
along with one another in their mutual
self-interest. Additionally, it appears
that this recognition of mutual interest
is directly attributable to the enlarged
economic and social interdependence of
the states within the community.
However, it may be that the law has
become more effective, and, whatever
theories one might wish to credit with
the responsibility for improved performance, it remains clear only that
such a body of "law" exists, and that it
is respected and obeyed by states in
varying degrees. If it is necessary to
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correlate this variable acceptance with
some factor, it readily appears that, at
least in the past, obedience and respect
for the law has generally been a function of state power and the interpretation of national interest. It must be
admitted that this situation seems reasonable to the individual observer in the
light of his own experience with his
fellowmen.
This last generalization, at least,
would seem to be borne out by some
members of the juristic community who
have considered the revised status of the
law of nations in the environment of the
world of the Iron Curtain and the cold
war. Regarding the historic evolution of
the law of nations itself, one author
states that "international legal norms
underwent constant reinterpretation
and development-generally keeping in
step with the evolving needs and policies
of the stronger states. "74 Another,
addressing himself more directly to the
polarized nature of modern world
politics, observes that "a realistic analysis of the limited scope for international
law in East-West relations implies that
ultimately, these relations are not
governed by law, but by power. "75 The
most chilling confirmation of the observer's assumption of a "power and
self-interest" theory to explain the
applicability of law in the modern context is provided by the words of a
Soviet jurist, who said in 1948:
Those institutions in international law which can facilitate the
execution of the stated tasks of
the USSR are recognized and
applied by the USSR, and those
institutions which conflict in any
manner with these purposes are
rejected by the USSR.7 6
How then should the law of blockade
be regarded in an era characterized by
such apostasy toward an institution
which once was viewed with almost the
same blind faith accorded religion? If
the law of blockade be a part of the law
of nations, and if that law of nations

can be expected to command the adherence of states only so long as those
states remain convinced of the selfadvantage of such adherence, it would
seem that the law of blockade may be
regarded as binding only insofar as its
tenets reflect the reality of modern
politics and economics. Wherever the
developed law of blockade can be
shown to rest on precedent no longer
valid in modern society, it should be
adhered to only if such adherence is in
the national interest. Preferably, such
aspects of the law should he rejected,
and newer and more timely principles
should be enunciated in order to bring
that doctrine to a more logical maturity.
In keeping with this view, let us
evaluate the elements of the law of
blockade as it seems to exist in the eyes
of modern writers and jurists and see if
it, in fact, conforms to the social order
which it is intended to serve.
First, it is contended that the right to
blockade is a belligerent right only; that
is, one which may be exercised only by
a nation in an acknowledged state of
war with another. The essence of the
point is that legality (i.e., general
approval by the states of society) can
attach only to a blockade proclaimed as
an act of war. However, there now
appears to be some doubt that any act
of war can be regarded as "legal"
because of the direction taken by the
body of international law after World
Wars I and II. Beginning with the
Covenant of the League of Nations after
World War 1,77 progressin~ through the
Pact of Paris in 1928, 8 and culminating in the Charter of the United
Nations signed in 1945,79 the international community steadily progressed
toward the official banishment of war as
an acceptable "legal" means of solving
international differences.
At least one authority considers that
the ancient right of states to make war
in the "traditional sense is definitely
ruled out" under the Charter of the
United Nations since the use of force
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for the settling of disputes is reserved to
the Security Council by that agreement. SO Thus, in a strict sense, no
degree of legality can be attached to any
violent act, excepting only acts taken in
self-defense.
However accurate this interpretation
may be, additional grounds seem to
exist for claiming legality for a blockade
not declared as an act of war under the
sanction of belligerent right. The status
of belligerence exists under law simply
as a means of describing the condition
of states not at peace. That is, it appears
to be based on the inability of the early
jurists or publicists to conceive of states
existing in a condition other than that
of war or its opposite, peace. There is,
however, some evidence indicating the
rccognition by a measurable segment of
opinion of a third status, beyond that of
peace yet short of war. For example, as
early as 1907 the English jurist Westlake
considered that such a condition could
exist, observing that "~cts of force are
not war unless either a government does
them with the intent of war or the
government against which they are done
clects to treat them as war. ,>81 A more
recent publicist expressed the idea more
concretely by stating that "there may
be ... a state of 'intermediacy' between
peace and war ... characterized
by ... hostility between the opposing
parties ... but accompanied by an
absence of intention or decision to go to
war. "S 2 In a comprehensive discussion
of the matter, another eminent authority conceded the significant advantage of recognizing such a sta~s of
intermediacy to be that it could be
endowed with "legal consequences"
similar in force and effect to the two
traditional conditions. S 3 In the view of
another author, such legal consequences
might "include limited restrictions on
the freedom of the seas hitherto recognized only in war but falling short of
full scale blockade.'>84 It is clear from
these observations that such a state of
intermediacy could exist only where the

parties to the dispute were unable to
resolve it within the purely peaceful
means now available under modern
international law yet were unwilling to
extend the tension to a complete war
status. Is it not equally plain that many
such situations can and will occur as a
result of the Soviet-American contest
for world leadership? Further, in view
of the great expansion of the Soviet
merchant marine in the last decade s5
and the expressed intention of the
Soviets to support "wars of national
liberation" wherever occurring, is it not
probable that confrontations at sea will
become commonplace in the future
between the naval forces of the West
and Soviet seapower? Already the
Cuban "quarantine" crisis of 1962
appears in retrospect as an obvious
example of a condition of intermediacy.
Because the status of that time had not
been widely enunciated, the condition
was not so easily recognized, nor even
now has it been generally accepted as a
principle. Yet, it would ~eem that such a
status must ultimately be recognized, as
so many others have been in the past,
because of the reality of political and
economic circumstances now abroad in
the international community.
Another characteristic of the law of
blockade which might be open to question in the light of modern experience is
that provision forbidding interference
with free access to neutral ports. In
discussing this provision, it might first
be observed that it, above all others,
seems to have been honored more in the
breach than in the observance almost
from the day of its formulation in 1909.
In World War I all pretense of compliance with this principle was dropped
after early 1915 by Great Britain. s6
The reality of her position on the
subject was expressed at a later date in
terms of clearly recognizing the
dominance of self-interest over principle. At that time one authority stated:
... the extent of a belligerent's
right to interfere with seaborne
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commerce is conditioned by the
extent of his command of the sea,
and that the real principle underlying the idea of blockade is the
right of a belligerent to deny to _
the commerce of his enemy the
use of areas of sea which he is in a
position effectively to control. 8 7
Associated with the dictum that
blockading forces may not interfere
with traffic enroute to and from neutral
ports is the requirement that no vessel
may be seized for breach of blockade if
she is first encountered on her way to a
neutral port. That is, the Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage may not be applied
to blockade. 8 8 A cursory review of
world history since 1914 would reveal
that the practice of states at war during
that period has been quite directly the
opposite from that intended by both
these requirements. In both world wars
tlle commerce of neutrals and belligerents alike was attacked mercilessly
with all of the means available to the
contesting powers. There does not seem
to be any reason to suspect that such
rules would be observed by the parties
to any future contest between the major
antagonists now dominating world
politics.
In point of fact, it seems ludicrous to
contemplate the possibility of any
meaningful observance of the "legal"
code of blockade in the current or
predictable future state of political
reality. It is clear that the rules of
blockade came into existence solely to
protect the ordinary sea commerce of
neutrals and to regulate the circumstances under which such trade could be
interrupted. The rules derive out of a
19th century legal regime-a regime
oriented toward regulating the conduct
of states in war and peace. 8 9 But
modern international law, of which
blockade is a part, no longer seeks to
regulate war but to prevent its occurrence. The formation of a world organization dedicated to this end has effectively ended the issue of neutral rights

at sea in war by outlawing war and by
the implied denial of the status of
neutrality in the face of armed conflict
by any member of the organization. If
neutrality as a legal subsystem in international law is inconsistent with the
collective security ~stem of the United
Nations as alleged,9 then observance of
rules created as part of that subsystem
have at least become optional if not
completely unnecessary. Certainly, in
view of the expressed intent of the
Soviet Union to observe only those
portions of the law of nations which are
consistent with its wishes, it would be
wise for other states to reserve to
themselves the degree of observance to
be given to patently outdated rules of
maritime war.

VII-CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Under the simplified circumstances
of antiquity, combatants recognized the
necessity of depriving the enemy of
supplies and reinforcements essential to
his continued resistance. As society
grew more complex and economically
more interdependent, the realities of
international politics dictated that some
concession be made to nonparticipants
to retain the support their supplies
would provide for warlike operations by
both sides. Such concessions led to the
concept of neutrality and ultimately
became thoroughly circumscribed with
technical conditions under which neutrals might continue trade with any
belligerent they could reach. But the
continuing evolution of international
society resulted in widening the scope
of wartime operations, as individual
states accrued great military power,
they acquired the ability to destroy
completely the social and economic
fabric of their enemies, and war had
become a matter of national survival by
the beginning of the 19th century.
Under these classic rules of neutrality, the right to blockade an enemy
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was a valued tool of the belligerent, for
only by complying with certain
accepted principles associated with the
institution could he deprive his enemy
of commerce with the general acquiescence of the world society. However, as
war became more total, the once simple
rules of blockade became more and
more complex until the technicalities
imposed in the name of neutral rights
obscured the fundamental purpose of
the institution itself-to cut off an
enemy's commerce and thus weaken or
starve him to the point of submission.
As the law grew out of touch with· the
realities of power and politics, states
which had the naval strength and the
national will to survive began to ignore,
corrupt, or circumvent the principles so
carefully constructed by the scholars
and legalists. The determining factors of
compliance with the laws became those
of self-interest and naval powertempered only by the ability of a state
to recognize its own long-term selfinterest Principle yielded to power and
necessity, and the emergence of the
20th century concept of total war
sounded the tocsin for any carefully
drawn rule which conflicted with the
necessities of such conflict
The body of international law which
exists today represents the result of
forces generated by conflict of the
international state system since the 17th
century. It grew in an environment of
constant change, but the rate of such
change remained fairly slow until recent
decades. Many of its precepts are rooted
in economic, social, and political experiences of the last century-and the
law of blockade is peculiarly representative of this fault
Speaking of international law in
general, one writer has said:
To the majority of the writers
and exponents of international
law, contemporary changes appear
as extensions and modifications
rather than as basic challenges to
the structure of international law

and relations. It is submitted that
the extent of the structural
changes in international relations
in our time requires a far more
basic reorientation in our thinking
in international law. 91
Such a basic reorientation is necessary at this time with regard to the law
of blockade. If the historic status of
"neutrality" can be regarded by some
authorities as extinct, why cannot a new
status supersede it? If armed confrontations between East and West are
accepted by the international community as being something other than
"war" in the traditional sense solely
because the contestants have no intention to engage in war, then some status
under law should be accorded to the
condition. Within such a new category
of law arising from the circumstances of
the society it is intended to serve, there
would be a place for a new code of
maritime war-a code which would reflect 20th century conditions rather
than the outmoded precedents set in an
era which could not even conceive of a
totally bipolarized world. It appears to
be manifestly clear that such a code
would contain rules for the conduct of
operations against commerce at sea.
Whether such actions be called block.ade
or "quarantine," commerce warfare will
always remain as a tool of seapower,
and a workable code for its conduct
could only benefit all of world society.
We are in an era of "limited war"
because the realities of "total war" in
the nuclear age are too grotesque to
consider as real possibilities. The one
characteristic of the 1962 Cuban "quarantine" which drew general approval
from the world community of nations
was its controlled and limited nature. 92
And one view expressed with regard to
the selection of the quarantine method
in response to the Soviet challenge of
that autumn remains valid today. Discussing the President's reasoning on the
selection of this action, Theodore
Sorensen has said of the operation:
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Whatever the balance of strategic and ground forces may have
been, the superiority of the
American Navy was unquestioned;
and. this superiority was worldwide, should Soviet submarines
retaliate elsewhere. 9 3
What is proposed herein is simply
that some form of sea operations against
Commerce be sanctioned despite the
absence of a traditional condition of
belligerency. If ever a traditional war
erupts between the major antagonists of
the modern world scene, the issue of
neutral rights at sea will be academic
even for the survivors. Some form of
conflict seems to be a reasonable expectation in the future as it even now
exists in Southeast Asia, and, therefore,
some provision should be made by the
international community to regulate the
application of seapower in such conflicts.
The most vociferous retort to this
proposal may very well be based on its
apparent suggestion that America
abandon its traditional advocacy of
"freedom of the seas," and so some
brief observations are appropriate on
that subject.
Freedom of the seas, in the classic
Wilsonian sense, means those rights
which we believe have accrued to all
states as a result of British policing of
the oceans in the decades since Trafalgar. The basic concept of freedom of
the seas presupposes the dominance of a
naval power so disposed as to make such
freedom possible for itself and others.
That Great Britain was such a power is
borne out by study of naval history. As
Bell remarks, "Great Britain was recognized to have protected the usages and
customs of Europe [and consequently
all of Western society] by her unflinching resistance to the Napoleonic
empire. "94 Now, with Britain eclipsed
by modern U.S. naval power, the burden of protecting, exploiting, or refuting those rights associated with the
concept of "freedom of the seas" lies

with the United States under the same
grounds that they once devolved upon
Britain. It is clearly the duty of such
power to be exercised in defense of the
concept when threatened by a power
which might not act to preserve such
freedom, but to hamper or destroy it.
All states have recognized the need to
accept restrictions on the usual freedom
to use the sea when war has broken out
between maritime states. 9S Such restrictions imposed in times of nominal peace
would undoubtedly generate widespread
outcry by the maritime states of the
world, but historic experience indicates
that under the pressing circumstances
now at issue-for example, in Vietnamsuch a move by the United States would
not long be opposed by states having a
sincere interest in preserving the
freedom which we have long championed at sea.
It is, therefore, proposed that the
United States take the initiative in
forcing the modification of the traditional laws associated with the institution of blockade: First, by a unilateral
statement that the existing doctrine is
inconsistent with the needs of modern
society; and, second, by propOSing appropriate modifications to the doctrine.
Such action should be followed by the
announcement of a n~val "quarantine"
of the port of Haiphong in North
Vietnam, including the application of
the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to
designated contraband at least to the
British Crown Colony port of Hong
Kong, where it has been observed that
much of the Haiphong commerce "originates. '>9 6 Such action could be tied in
with the recent and continuing efforts
of the United States to secure peace in
that area by: (1) announcing the naval
quarantine to be a more humane substitute for the aerial bombing campaign
recently resumed; and (2) calling upon
all states who have expressed disapproval of the bombing action to join
with the United States in carrying out
the quarantine operation.
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One precedent of the historical law
of maritime warfare seems most applicable even today, and that is the argument in favor of exceptional measures
being valid when states find themselves
engaged in an "exceptional" struggle.
Writing of the events at sea in 1689,
Samuel Puffendorf acknowledged that
powers engaged in defense of the religious liberty of Europe were not required
to observe ordinary rules of capture;
again in 1792, it was claimed, with some
justice, that "extraordinary rigours were
justifiable against a regicide government
[France], who were themselves contemptuous of the law of nations.'>9 7

The United States is today engaged
in an exceptional struggle for which
there are few hard and fast rules. If we
must act to set new precedents on the
ground in the face of this need, we
should equally act to set precedents on
the seas. Both actions will stand to
guide nations in the future.
In the words of one commentator:
United States naval power
makes freedom of the seas possible. During periods of belligerence, that freedom is subject to
control The bloody Ho Chi Minh
trail is long and winding. It begins
at sea. 9 8
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APPENDIX I

THE RULE OF 1756 AND THE
DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE
European mercantilist doctrine in the 18th century asserted that colonies
existed ·only to supply the mother country with raw materials and to provide
a market for the processed goods of the homeland. In Britain, to prevent
encroachment by outsiders in this profitable two-way trade, a series of laws
had been enacted to deprive outsiders of participation in colonial trade, in
part by requiring that all such trade be carried on in ships of the British flag.
France and others had similar regulations for the trade of their colonies.
When war broke out among the colonial powers, as it frequently did,
belligerent £lag ships and their cargoes became lawful prize. Under such
circumstances, how was the mother country to continue to supply and be
supplied by her overseas colonies?
The answer, of course, was to carry on colonial trade using neutral £lag
bottoms; but the right of neutral ships to carry enemy goods was itself a
source of heated controversy among maritime powers, and even more so
when belligerents employed neutral ships only to carry on colonial trade
''lith out enduring the risk of confiscation associated with their own £lag. 1
To confound this practice, British prize courts evolved what became
known as the Rule of the War, 1756, under whiCh neutrals were prohibited,
by confiscation if intercepted, from participating in colonial trade in war if
such trade were denied them in peace by the laws of the mother country.2
Hoping to evade this rule, neutrals and belligerent shippers conspired to
make the colonial voyages in two distinct stages, the first from the colony to
a neutral port, and the second from that port to the mother country.
Fictitious transfers of ownership and actual or simulated transshipment of the
cargo while in the interim port were often resorted to in order to disguise the
true character of the voyage from intercepting cruisers. This practice
permitted them to claim that captures made during either segment of the
voyage were illegal, since neutral trade to and from neutral ports was always
allowed.
The prize courts responded with the development of the Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage under which cargoes were condemned at any stage in the
voyage, disregarding paper transfers and transshipments as "a fraudulent
contrivance merely on account of the war to continue the original voyage and
cover the goods of the enemy to their destined port."3
IFor a general summary, see Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights,
1739·1763 (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 169. The controversy on neutral
rights stemmed from a fundamental difference between Continental and British jurists
on the sources and character of international law. Pares (pp. 148-162) disagrees with
other authorities who assert that the issues were resolved before this time. See
Neutrality: the Origins, v. I., p. 247.
2Pares, pp. 18()'204. See also Neutrality: the Origins, p. 153, where they describe the
Rule as "one of the clearest examples of the economic basis of the law of neutral and
belligerent rights. It was a measure adapted ... to meet a definite economic problem."
3Decision in the case of the ship Young Gertruyde Adriane, June 1764. Quoted in
Pares, p. 221.

